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Recently, the Corporate Law Reform Committee (―CLRC‖) operated under 
the Companies Commission of Malaysia (―CCM‖) has recommended that 
judicial management (―JM‖) be introduced in Malaysia as one of the ways to 
deal with the corporate insolvency matters. The application for appointment 
of JM may be made by the company itself, the directors or the creditors.  
The JM is armed with a moratorium power against any action taken which 
may be commenced by the creditors and others to ensure that he can 
effectively carry out his duty to prepare and implement the approved 
restructuring plan for the benefits of the insolvent company and its creditors 
as a going concern.  This paper aims to elaborate the CLRC‖s 
recommendations on Judicial Management and to study its strength and 
weaknesses particularly in dealing with the problems of abandoned housing 
projects.  This paper also is a result of a research conducted through a 
comparative legal research methodology. Two jurisdictions, viz the Republic 
of Singapore and the United Kingdom, have been selected for comparative 
analysis over their respective laws and practices on Judicial Management.  
Further, this comparative study is to investigate, identify and find the 
respective jurisdictions‖ strengths and weaknesses on Judicial Management, 
which Malaysia can learn from particularly in the face of the abandoned 
housing projects‖ problems.  This paper finds that the recommendation by 
the CLRC for the appointment of Judicial Manager is commendable.  
Nonetheless, it is submitted that, in the case of abandoned housing projects, 
his appointment armed with certain statutory and legal powers as 
recommended by the CLRC still does not fully provide comprehensive 
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solution in dealing with the rehabilitation of abandoned housing projects and 
protect the rights and interests of the aggrieved purchasers.  Equally, this 
paper suggests certain proposals to improve the corporate rehabilitation 
mechanism carried out by the JM in insolvency administration involving 
insolvent housing developer companies whose housing development 
projects are abandoned.  In the course of carrying the judicial management, 
this paper also suggests certain ideas on how to protect the rights and 
interests of the aggrieved purchasers in abandoned housing projects.  
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If a company is unable to pay its debts, it may be subject to various 
insolvency proceedings on the application of the stakeholders especially the 
creditors.  The purpose the insolvency approach is for the insolvency 
administrator to take over the affairs of the debtor company in order to settle 
the debts of the creditors.   
 
There are many types of insolvency approach in Malaysia.  The most 
popular ones are: liquidation, receivership and Scheme of Arrangement 
(SOA).  The newly introduced insolvency methods by Corporate Law 
Reform Committee (CLRC) are the Corporate Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) 
and the Judicial Management.   
 
CLRC is headed by Dato‖ KC Vohrah.  Its members consist of 25 persons 
from various backgrounds such as advocate & solicitors, representatives 
from the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), Securities 
Commission (SC), Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad, Prime Minister‖s 
department, Attorney General Chambers (AGC), Insolvency Department, 
company secretaries, chartered accountants and academics. CLRC is also 
supported by several working groups‖ members and a secretariat.  CLRC 
has conducted a research into the current provisions under the Companies 
Act 1965 (―CA‖) since December 2003 which took about four years to 
complete. The result is the Final Report of the CLRC (Companies 
Commission of Malaysia, 2011). 
 
For the purpose of this paper, only Judicial Management (JM), being one of 
the innovative insolvency methods that has been proposed by CLRC, which 
will be discussed in respect of its ability to deal with problems in abandoned 
housing projects and its rehabilitation, particularly in Malaysia, the Republic 
of Singapore and the United Kingdom. 
 




It is an undisputed fact that abandoned housing projects are a negative 
phenomena the plague the housing industry in Malaysia.  The issue of 
abandoned housing projects began with the adoption of a housing 
democracy by the Malaysian government in the 1960s. Prior to the 1960s, 
public housing was provided by the government itself. However, due to 
insufficiency of government funds and the upsurges in demand for housing 
ownership and needs, the government opened door for private housing 
developers to participate in providing public housing to the citizens. This 
policy was supported by aggressive government assistance, incentives and 
legal means to ensure its success.  Despite such efforts, the occurrences of 
abandoned housing projects have marred the role of private housing 
developers in respect of national development and safeguarding the 
interests of its citizen purchasers.  As a result, many purchasers have 
become victims of abandoned housing projects.  Hitherto, there are still 
inadequate measures to protect the rights and interests of the aggrieved 
purchasers in abandoned housing projects.  
 
There are various reasons causing abandoned housing projects and the 
consequential problems they have caused are grave. One of the reasons is 
that there are insufficient legal provisions and protection to avoid and 
prevent abandonment and to protect the interests of purchasers. In the 
event that rehabilitation can be carried out, the ensuing problems caused--
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, are still left hanging and unsettled for 
most of the purchasers and stakeholders, without any sufficient remedies 
and measures to address them.  
 
Some quarters say that the current housing policy and industry in Malaysia 
is still healthy, notwithstanding the plight of purchasers of abandoned 
housing projects, poor workmanship of the houses and other housing 
problems.  ―The problem of abandoned housing projects only represents 1-
3% of the total housing projects‖.  ―The remaining 97%-99% of housing 
projects succeeds‖.  ―Thus, the current concept of housing delivery and 
policies should be continued regardless of the plaguing occurrences of 
abandoned housing projects‖ and their negative consequences befalling the 
purchasers‖ (Dato' Abu Bakar Bin Hassan & Dato' Zainudin bin Tala, 
personal communication, August 13, 2010).  
 
Unfortunately, these are some of the statements made by persons in 
authority in Malaysia‖s housing industry.  Nonetheless, despite these 
statements, there are still inadequate measures taken by the government to 
alleviate the problems of abandoned housing projects, not even the current 
newly established Division of Rehabilitation of Abandoned Projects under 
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the Department of National Housing, Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government (―MHLG‖), the recent amendments made to the Housing 
Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (Act 118) and the recent 
recommendations by PEMUDAH can.  The measures taken are still ―too little 
too late‖ in the face of the catastrophe caused by abandoned housing 
projects‖.  The fallen preys are the aggrieved purchasers themselves.  The 
law governing the housing industry in Malaysia – the Housing Development 
(Control and Licensing) Act 1966 and its regulations (Act 118) is evidently 
unable to fully address the problems of abandoned housing projects.  The 
court also seems indecisive in protecting the interests of the aggrieved 
purchasers in abandoned housing projects.  This is partly due to ―too many 
conflicting considerations and equities‖ that the court needs to deal with in 
cases involving abandoned housing projects.  Thus in certain 
circumstances, the rights and interests of the purchasers may not be fully 
appreciated and taken into consideration by the court.  The problem 
becomes more severe where housing developer company is subject to the 
insolvency administration.  In the insolvency administration, the insolvent 
ailing company becomes bankrupt and all the assets and moneys will be 
used to settle off the debts of the creditors and there may not be any 
sufficient monetary balance which can be used to rehabilitate the 
abandoned housing projects and to compensate the aggrieved purchasers 
(Nuarrual Hilal Md. Dahlan. (2009).  
 
Among the reasons leading to the abandonment of housing projects, in 
Malaysia, are: 
1) Financial problems faced by the developers. The cause of this 
problem is owing to the problems with the developers‖ financial and 
construction management (severe liquidity problems and high 
gearing) to meet the construction costs and to repay creditors; 
2) Loose approval of the applications for housing developer licences by 
MHLG.  MHLG fails to obtain the requisite advice and opinions from 
economists, legal experts, property experts and other experts in 
approving the applications; and, 
3) Challenges and problems of dealing with and clearing the project site 
of squatters (Nuarrual Hilal Md. Dahlan, 2009). 
 
The grievances and problems faced by the purchasers, if a housing 
development project is abandoned, are: 
1) They are unable to get vacant possession of the units on time as 
promised by the vendor developers. 
2) The construction of the houses is terminated or partly completed 
resulting in the houses being unsuitable for occupation for a long 
duration of time, unless the units can expeditiously be revived. 
3) In the course of the abandonment of the project, purchasers still 
have to bear all and keep up the monthly installments of the housing 
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loans repayable to their respective end-financiers, failing which, the 
purchased lots being the security for the housing loan would be sold 
off and with the possibility of the borrower purchasers be made 





The questions are: 
1) Whether the rights and interests of the purchasers, in the abandoned 
housing projects of the insolvent housing developer companies 
which are subject to JM administration, are fully protected? And, 
2) If the purchasers‖ rights and interests are not protected, how could 
the proposed JM proposed law be improved and improvised for the 
benefits and protections of the purchasers‖ rights and interests? 
 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER 
 
1) To study the rights and interests of the purchasers in abandoned 
housing projects whose housing developer companies are subject to a 
JM administration; 
2) To study the proposed JM legal provisions as recommended by the 
CLRC insofar as these provisions can deal with the problems of 
abandoned housing projects and its rehabilitation; and, 
3) To suggest certain legal provisions to improve the proposed JM 
provisions so that the proposed JM can sufficiently able to deal with the 
problems of abandoned housing projects and its rehabilitation and 




SIGNIFICANT OF RESEARCH 
 
It is opined that this research will be beneficial to the purchasers in 
abandoned housing project and the government regulatory bodies in 
Malaysia on housing industry and insolvency matters by way of highlighting 
the problems they may face in dealing with insolvent housing developer 
companies which are subject to the JM administration and their housing 
projects are abandoned.  Certain proposed recommendations are also 
provided in this paper for consideration of these stakeholders to adopt for 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Currently, a housing project in Malaysia can be deemed to have been 
abandoned when: 
a) The construction activities on site of the housing project have 
consecutively stopped for six months or more, after the expiry of the 
Sale and Purchase Agreement (S&P) executed by the developer and 
the purchaser; or, 
b) The developer has been put under the control of the Official 
Receiver; or, 
c) The developers admit in writing to the Housing Controller that they 
are unable to complete their projects; and, 
d) The project is endorsed as an abandoned housing project by the 
Minister of Housing and Local Government pursuant to section 
11(1)(c) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 
1966 (Act 118) (Official Portal of the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government 2011).  
 
Very recently, with the amendments made to Act 118 vide the Housing 
Development (Control and Licensing) (amendment) Act 2012 (Act A1415), 
abandoned housing project has been defined as any housing developer who 
has refused to carry out or delays or suspends or ceases work continuously 
for a period of six months or more or beyond the stipulated period of 
completion as agreed under the sale and purchase agreement.   This 
amendment is spelt out in section 9(2) of Act A1415.  However, as at todate, 
the amendments have as yet been enforced and come into operation 
(Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2012; Official Portal e-Federal Gazette, 
Attorney General―s Chambers 2012). 
 
 
JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT (‘JM’) 
 
According to the Corporate Law Reform Committee (―CLRC‖), a qualified 
insolvency practitioner/qualified independent person should be appointed as 
the Judicial Manager  of the insolvent company for the purpose of 
restructuring the rehabilitation scheme of the insolvent company.  To 
undertake this duty, the Judicial Manager shall be provided with a 
moratorium power against any action which may be prejudicial to his duty in 
carrying out the rehabilitation scheme of the insolvent companies for the 
benefits of the creditors.  The powers and rights of this proposed judicial 
management is substantially akin to the powers and rights of administration 
and judicial management in the United Kingdom (―UK‖) and the Republic of 
Singapore.  Among the recommendations of the CLRC in respect of the 
proposed judicial management are: (Companies Commission of Malaysia, 
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Review of the CA – Final Report, 2011; A Consultative Document” (1) 
Reviewing the Corporate Insolvency Regime, 2012). 
1) The court should be empowered to make a judicial management 
order in relation to a company if it is satisfied that the company is or 
will be unable to pay its debts and it considers that the making of the 
order would be likely to: 
a) achieve the company‖s survival on the whole or in part; and 
b) enable a more advantageous realization of the company‖s 
assets than in winding up (recommendation 4.18 of the 
Review of the CA – Final Report (―Review‖)). 
2) The Judicial Manager must be armed with a moratorium power to 
enable him to prepare the rehabilitation plan without any potential 
threat of a winding up of the company or any court action by the 
creditors which may likely frustrate the judicial management process 
(recommendation 4.22 of the Review). 
3) The Judicial Manager should be given 180 days to table a proposal 
to creditors, and where appropriate the court should be entitled to 
give an extension of time to the Judicial Manager to do so, but the 
maximum duration of the moratorium should be one year after the 
order appointing the Judicial Manager is made (recommendation 
4.24 of the Review). 
4) Any secured creditor be given a right to oppose the petition for a 
judicial management order.  However, once the judicial management 
order has been made the secured creditor should not be permitted to 
realize their security and the Judicial Manager should have the 
power to deal with the charged property of the company as if the 
property were not subject to the security.  There should also be an 
express statutory provision that once the proposal is approved, it 
shall be binding on all creditors of the company whether or not they 
have voted in favour of the proposal (recommendation 4.29 of the 
Review).  
5) The creditors should be able to bring an action for relief against 
oppressive conduct if the court is satisfied the company‖s affairs, 
property or business are being or have been managed by the 
Judicial Manager in a manner which is or was unfairly prejudicial to 
the interests of its creditors or members generally or of some part of 
its creditors or members (recommendation 4.31 of the Review).  
6) The judicial management order should be discharged in the following 
situations: 
a) if the proposal has not been approved by the requisite 
majority in the creditors’ meeting and where the court 
orders the discharge of the Judicial Manager. The court 
should be entitled by order to discharge the judicial 
management order and make such consequential provision 
as it thinks fit, or adjourn the hearing conditionally or 
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unconditionally, or make an interim order or any other order 
that it thinks fit; 
b) if the purpose of the judicial management has been 
successfully achieved; 
c) if the Judicial Manager if of the view that the purpose of 
judicial management is unachievable; and, 
d) if the Judicial Manager applies for a discharge, or is no longer 
qualified to be a Judicial Manager or is removed from office, 
unless the court makes an order replacing the existing 
Judicial Manager (recommendation 4.32 of the Review). 
 
Whether JM is Suitable to be used to Facilitate Rehabilitation of 
Abandoned Housing Projects and Protect the Purchasers’ Rights in 
Malaysia? 
 
In the author opinion, if majority or the requisite number of creditors agreed 
that a JM be carried out in order to ensure rehabilitation of the abandoned 
housing projects of the insolvent housing developer companies,  JM can be 
used to actualize the purported rehabilitation.  Nonetheless, if the available 
funds to finance the rehabilitation are inadequate and that there are many 
complications and problems in the abandoned housing projects to the effect 
of jeopardizing the creditors‖ rights and interests, it is opined, JM may not be 
the best insolvency method to rehabilitate the projects and protect the rights 
and interests of the purchasers.  
 
It is opined, in order to ensure that rehabilitation can effectively be carried 
out, it is proposed that the Malaysian government should introduce Housing 
Development Insurance which is imposed on all the applicant developers 
before housing developer‖s licence can be issued.  This insurance can be 
used as a financial support in case the appointed rehabilitating party is in 
shortage of fund or the available funds are inadequate.  Further, a special 
law governing rehabilitation of abandoned housing project is warranted to 
ensure that the rehabilitation administration can be smoothly run and protect 
the rights and interests all the related parties in the project.  This law should 
be incorporated in the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 
1966 (Act 118). 
 
In the author‖s opinion, besides the above suggestions, the Malaysian 
government should adopt “full build then sell‖ of housing delivery concept to 
guard against any occurrences of abandoned housing projects and its 
problematic consequences.  Through this concept, it is believed that this 
concept can eliminate altogether the problems and occurrences of 
abandoned housing projects in Malaysia.  
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ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
In the UK, it is opined, the same modus operandi that JM operates is called 
―Administration‖.  In administration, the affairs and business of the insolvent 
ailing company is put into the control of an appointed administrator.  With 
the enforcement of the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA), the appointment of 
administrator can be made either by the debenture holders, the creditors of 
the insolvent company or the company itself or the directors of the 
insolvency company, either through the court or out of court.  A company 
cannot usually enter administration if the company is in administration 
already, is in liquidation or is subject to an effective administrative 
receivership (para 39 of Schedule B1 of the UKIA). 
 
The availability of administration came into being on the concern that if the 
insolvent company has no floating charge, created through the deed of 
debenture, over his assets favourable to the creditors (debenture holders), 
administrative receiver cannot be appointed.  
 
The purpose of administration is to deal with the assets and manage the 
business of the insolvent company to settle or pay off all the debts of the 
creditors as well as to improve the position of the company‖s creditors.  In a 
nutshell, administration is an insolvency measure to rescue the ailing 
insolvent company and foster a rescue culture for business. (Keay & 
Walton, 2003; Hammonds (a firm) v Pro-Fit USA Ltd [2007] EWHC 1998 
(Ch)l [2008] 2 BCLC 159).  
 
According to para 3(1) of Schedule B1 UKIA, the purposes of administration 
are to: 
a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
b) achieving a better result for the company‖s creditors as a whole than 
would be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in 
administration), or 
c) realizing property in order to make a distribution to one or more 
secured or preferential creditors. 
 
An administrator‖s general duty is to perform his functions in the interests of 
the company‖s creditors as a whole (para 3(2) of Schedule B1 UKIA) and to 
perform his functions as quickly and efficiently and as is reasonably 
practicable (para 4 of Schedule B1 UKIA). 
 
The administrator‖s plans may involve the proposed rescue of the company 
by way of a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) or may involve the 
realization of the company‖s assets in a more ordered and beneficial 
manner than could be achieved in a winding up.  In carrying out this duty, 
the administrator is armed with moratorium power. This power prevents any 
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action by any creditors against the conducts of the administrator for 
ensuring that the debts settlement process is done smoothly unless with the 
consent of the court or the administrator (Keay & Walton, 2003).  The 
privilege also is to allow the administrator time and space to put together a 
package to ameliorate the company‖s financial position. Nonetheless the 
power of moratorium can be lifted on the agreement of the administrator or 
the court (Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1992] Ch 505, Environmental 
Agency v Clark [2001] Ch 57 and Re Atlantic Computer System Ltd (No. 
1)[1992] Ch 505). 
 
If the company rescue is not possible, the administrator may be able to turn 
the business around and dispose of the business as a going concern and, 
thus, save the economic unit of the business.  The administrator may find 
that the best that can be achieved is a disposal of the company‖s assets 
which at least obtains a better price than would be achieved on an 
immediate winding up. After the sale, the company, by that point is an empty 
shell, will be wound up (Keay & Walton, 2003). 
 
If the administrators thinks that rescuing the company is not reasonably 
practicable, or that the objective contained within para 3(1)(b) of Schedule 
B1 of the UKIA would not achieve a better result for the creditors as a 
whole, then the administrators may not attempt to rescue the company.  
Company rescue is usually a very difficult goal to achieve.  The time and 
expense involved in turning a company around may be prohibitive, 
especially where a simple sale of business to a buyer could be effected 
quickly and relatively cheaply.  There is likely to be more money left for the 
creditors if a quick sale can be achieved, rather than if the company 
undertakes a long and expensive rescue package (Keay & Walton, 2003). 
 
If the administrator believes that neither the objectives in para 3(1)(a) or (b) 
UKIA is reasonably practicable, he may carry out his functions with the 
purpose listed in para 3(1)(c) UKIA instead.  This would be so if there was 
clearly only enough money in the company to pay some of the secured or 
preferential creditors.  In such a scenario, owing a duty to act in the interests 
of the company‖s creditors as a whole would be a nonsense, as unsecured 
creditors would have no interest in the result of the administration.  If this is 
the case, the administrator must act in such a way that does not 
unnecessarily harm the interests of the creditors (para 3(4)(b) of Schedule 
B1 UKIA). 
 
The administrator‖s job is to put together some proposals in an attempt to 
satisfy one of the three statutory purposes under para 3(1) of Schedule B1 
UKIA.  Under para 49, a statement of proposals is sent, as soon as is 
reasonably practicable after the appointment, to the Registrar of Companies 
and to the company‖s creditors and members. The statement must explain 
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why, if this is the conclusion the administrator has reached, the 
administrator thinks that neither of the purposes mentioned in para 3(1)(a) 
and (b)  UKIA (company rescue or a better deal for the creditors generally 
than an immediate winding up would achieve) can be achieved.  If a rescue 
seems reasonably practicable the statement may include a proposal for a 
company voluntary arrangement (CVA) (under Part 1 of the UKIA) or a 
scheme of arrangement (under section 425 of the Companies Act 1985). 
 
It is observed that administration as practised in the UK is a creditor-centric.  
This is clearly evident even in section 27(1)(a) UKIA, where the creditors 
and members of the insolvent company is given a right to take action 
against the administrator if proven that the administrator is acting in a 
manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its creditors or 
members generally, or of some part of its creditors or members (including at 
least himself).   The court if it satisfies with the application may make such 
order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of, 
or adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally, or make an interim 
order or any other order that it thinks fit (section 27(1)(b) UKIA).  The court 
order may include termination of the said administrator. 
 
Thus the rights of the customers, shareholders and other stakeholders in the 
administration may be marginalized and set aside for the benefits of the 
creditors and the members.  There are some scholars who have criticized 
this position, in that the establishment of administration is not just only to 
rescue the company as a going concern but should also to protect the 
interests of the larger stakeholders including, it is submitted, the customer 
purchasers in abandoned housing projects.  They premised this idea on 
section 8(3)(a) UKIA itself, which provides that an administration order can 
be made for the purpose, inter alia, of the survival of the company and the 
whole or any part of its undertaking as a going concern (Finch, 2002; Re 
Rowbothan Baxter Ltd [1990] BCC 113). 
 
If a housing developer company in the UK is insolvent and abandons its 
housing development project, on the application of the appropriate parties 
(creditors, directors or debenture holders or the company itself), the 
administrator may rescue the company including to rehabilitate the project 
left abandoned by the company.  Nonetheless, this (rehabilitation of 
abandoned housing project) may not be possible if the moneys are not 
sufficient and that there are many complications to the project resulting in 
the rehabilitation of the project is not viable and detrimental to the creditors‖ 
interests, thus leaving the purchasers aggrieved without obtaining adequate 
remedies.  However, it is submitted that, the problem of inadequate of fund 
can be lessened if there is a housing development insurance/home warranty 
insurance subscribed by the purchaser or the vendor-developer to cover any 
cost to revive the abandoned houses.   
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The administrator must as soon as he takes office take control of the 
company‖s property (para 67 of Schedule B1 UKIA).  The administrator shall 
use his statutory powers to manage the company in accordance with any 
proposals which have been approved by the creditors‖ meeting or according 
to any directions of the court (para 68 of Schedule B1 UKIA). 
 
If a creditor or member can show that the administrator is acting or proposes 
to act in a way which unfairly harms the interests of the creditor or member, 
he may apply to the court.  An application may also be made by a creditor or 
member if the administrator is not performing his functions as quickly or 
efficiently as is reasonably practicable (para 74 of Schedule B1 UKIA).  The 
court has a wide discretion in terms of the type of order it may make if the 
ground for the applications is made out.  In particular the court may regulate 
the administrator‖s exercise of his functions, may require the administrator to 
do or not to do a specified thing, order a creditor‖s meeting to be called, or 
provide for the administrator‖s appointment to cease (Keay & Walton, 2003). 
 
Hence it is clear that the protection of the interests of the creditors is the 
paramount duty of the administrator.  In abandoned housing projects in the 
UK, it is submitted, the aggrieved purchasers can apply to the court (for 
lifting the moratorium power of the administrator) compelling the 
administrator and the company to carry out rehabilitation.  However if this 
application is not agreeable by the creditors and members on the ground 
that the rehabilitation is not viable and would be detrimental to their 
interests, the purchasers rights and interests may be affected.  Nonetheless, 
the author is of the opinion that the purchasers can invoke equity and 
contractual terms emanating from the contract of sale executed between the 
insolvent housing developer company and the purchasers to compel the 
administrator and the company to carry out rehabilitation and pay equitable 
damages.  The issue of shortage of fund to finance the rehabilitation may 
not pose a problem as in the UK it is a normal practice that the housing 
developer company should have possessed housing development 
insurance before embarking on the housing development projects.  
 
Like administrative receiver, the powers of an administrator are also 
prescribed under Schedule 1 of the UKIA.  
 
Housing Delivery Concept in the UK 
 
There are two types of housing development in the UK. Firstly, “full build 
then sell” concept.  Under this concept, the developer will construct the 
housing units until duly completion and once completed, these units are sold 
to purchasers.  Secondly, in the UK there is “buying new homes off plan” or 
“selling off plan” concept of housing development.  Under this concept, the 
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purchasers are required to pay 10% of the purchase price, the balance 90% 
shall be paid on the duly completion of the house (Healys‖s, 2011).  Thirdly, 
under the “buying new homes off plan”, the vendor vendor-developers may 
obtain a housing insurance/home warranty insurance.  If in case the 
construction of the house is abandoned or stopped in the mid-stream of the 
development or the developer becomes bankrupt thus terminates the 
construction of the project, the insurance coverage may be utilized to 
finance the completion or rehabilitation of the abandoned units.  
Nonetheless there is no statutory standard sale and purchase agreement 
governing housing purchase in the UK.  The terms and conditions in the 
contract of sale of house are dependent on the prudent of the vendor and 
purchasers or their solicitors.  Thus if the vendor-developer or the purchaser 
do not possess housing insurance/home warranty insurance, if 
abandonment occurs, the purchaser will become the aggrieved party.  
However, pursuant to clauses 7.5.1, 7.5.2 and 7.5.3 of the Standard 
Conditions of Sales (Fifth Edition) (National Conditions of Sale 25th Edition, 
Law Society‖s Conditions of Sale 2011) if the seller (vendor developer) fails 
to complete in accordance with a notice to complete (i.e abandons the 
construction of the house), the buyer may rescind the housing contract, the 
buyer entitles to return of deposit with accrued interest and that the buyer 
retains his other rights and remedies against the defaulting seller (vendor 
developer) (Standard Conditions Of Sale (Fifth Edition), 2011). 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is no legislation in the United Kingdom making 
new home warranties compulsory, and no statutory builder registration 
procedures.  However, the non-statutory “Buildmark” housing development 
insurance scheme run by the National House and Building Council (NHBC), 
a private association, covers approximately 90 per cent of new homes built 
for sale.   This insurance covers major defects and against the insolvency of 
the builder, i.e when the housing projects are abandoned, this insurance can 
cover the cost of rehabilitation (National House Building Council, 2012). 
 
The two major providers of building warranty inspection and insurance for 
new homes and residential developments are the NHBC and Zurich 
Municipal insurance. The Federation for Master Builders also provides a 
scheme, but it is used mainly for alterations and additions rather than new 
builds.  The NHBC is the non-government setter and inspector of standards 
for the new homes industry in the United Kingdom.  In 1985, NHBC became 
an approved inspector under the Building Act 1985 and in 1997 the licence 
was derestricted to cover any developments in the United Kingdom.  The 
NHBC also provides a regulatory concept which works by registering house 
builders.  Over 18,000 house builders who construct approximately 85% of 
the new homes built each year in the UK are registered with the NHBC.  
Builders who apply for registration undergo a technical and financial vetting 
concept and approximately 10% of applications are rejected as a result.  
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Non-compliance with NHBC Rules or Standards can lead to investigation 




JM IN THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE 
 
In the Republic of Singapore similar method of rescuing the insolvent 
company is available as the method operated by administration in the 
United Kingdom.  However in Singapore, this method is called judicial 
management.  Judicial management is a method of rescuing the insolvent 
company in Singapore by way court‖s appointment of judicial manager either 
on the application by the creditors or the company itself.  The purpose of 
judicial management is to take over the affairs and business of the ailing 
company and maximize the rescue/rehabilitation process of the insolvent 
company in the most advantageous, efficient and practical ways and for the 
benefits of the creditors, including the unsecured creditors, without having to 
go through the process of liquidation which lacks certain 
favourable/advantageous characteristics.  According to GP Selvam J in Re 
Genesis Technologies International (S) Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR 390 (High 
Court of Singapore) at page 391: 
 
“Judicial management is an alternative to winding up because, as 
long as a judicial management order is in force, no resolution may be 
passed or order made for the winding up of a company. Its primary 
objective is to give the company a new lease of life as a going 
concern. It is, therefore, a device to save the company from 
creditors who may wish to destroy the company when it can be 
rehabilitated for the benefit not only of the shareholders but the 
unsecured creditors as well” (emphasis added). 
 
In order to execute the judicial manager‖s duties and exercise his powers in 
the judicial management smoothly and efficiently, he is armed with a 
moratorium power (section 227D(4) of the SCA).  This power will shield him 
from any actions commenced by any parties including the creditors (Electro 
Magnetic (S) Ltd v Development Bank of Singapore [1994] 1 SLR 734). 
 
On the application for the appointment of judicial manager, apart from being 
satisfied that the company is insolvent and unable to pay its debts (section 
227B(1)(a) of the SCA), the court must also be satisfied that the order 
sought will be likely to achieve one of the following purposes:(Section 
227B(1)(b) of the SCA). 
 
a) the survival of the company, or the whole or part of its undertaking 
as a going concern; 
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b) the approval under section 210 of the SCA in respect of a 
compromise or scheme of arrangement; 
c) a more advantageous realization of the company‖s assets than 
would be effected on a winding up. 
 
Nevertheless the court will always be vigilant in order to grant or not the 
application for judicial management so that only genuine applications can be 
allowed to proceed.  Otherwise, some unscrupulous parties may apply and 
abuse this mode of insolvency to their own self interest advantages.  For 
example the unauthorized motives may involve: to stave off a compulsory 
winding up or prevent execution being levied against the company‖s 
property as a ruse by the company to buy time.  A creditor may apply to 
have the application be struck out either on the basis that the requirements 
of section 227A of the SCA (the inability of the company to pay its debts or 
that rehabilitation of the company is appropriate) are not satisfied or 
pursuant to the court‖s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process.   
 
In Re Genesis Technologies Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR 390 (High Court of 
Singapore) the court held that it should be vigilant to ensure that judicial 
management is not used by directors or shareholders to the detriment of the 
creditors. The motive for an application for judicial management should be 
honourable.  In this case, the applicant company failed to credibly 
demonstrate how it had got into its present difficulties and how the situation 
was to be improved.  The applicant company also failed to make out the 
grounds on which the petition was founded.  Due to this reason the 
application for judicial management by the applicant company was 
dismissed by the court. 
 
No guidelines are given to assist the court in determining when to exercise 
its discretion to make a judicial management order.  May be, some kind of 
consideration is emphasized i.e the balance of inconvenience test will be 
used.  Perhaps that the court should take into consideration the interests of 
the public, the company, the members and the creditors before deciding 
whether or not to make such an order.  In this respect, it should be 
remembered that the judicial management order is meant primarily to 
protect the company from its creditors.  The making of such an order is an 
inroad into the rights of the creditor, who have a right to be paid what is due 
to them when it is due.  A judicial management order should be made only if 
it can be shown on a balance of probabilities that the making of the order 
would achieve one of the purposes set out in section 227B(1) of the SCA 
and that no irreparable injury and damage would be caused to the creditors 
by the issuance of the order.  According to Chak Sek Keong J in Re 
Cosmotron Electronics (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1989] 2 MLJ 11 (High Court at 
Singapore), if the purposes sought to be achieved by the company in judicial 
management can similarly be achieved by the creditors in some other way 
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without any detriment to the company or its shareholders, the company 
would not have made out a valid case for judicial management.  Thus, if 
rehabilitation of abandoned housing project may also rescue and pay off the 
debts of the company to the creditors, according to this case (Re 
Cosmotron), the company may so proceed without having to use judicial 
management.  
 
It should be noted that the provision in the SCA only provides a right to the 
creditors to oppose the nomination of certain persons to become judicial 
manager, not a right to oppose the making of a judicial management order 
(section 227B(3)(c) of the SCA read together with regulation 35(1) of the 
Singapore Company Regulations). 
 
The court in Singapore may not make a judicial management order under 
the following circumstances: 
1) If the company has already gone into liquidation (section 227B(7)(a) 
of the SCA); 
2) If the company is a bank, a finance company or an insurance 
company (section 227B(7)(b)(c) of the SCA); 
3) If a receiver and manager has been or will be appointed (section 
227B(9) of the SCA). 
 
However, notwithstanding these prohibitions, the court has a power to 
appoint a judicial manager if some overriding public interest requires it, 
despite the foregoing prohibitions or that it may not be satisfied that the 
making of the order would be likely to achieve one or more of the purposes 
set out in section 227b(1) (section 227B(10(a)) SCA and Re Cosmotron 
Electronics (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1989] 2 MLJ 11 (High Court at Singapore).  
 
It may be argued that a judicial manager is required to undertake 
rehabilitation of abandoned housing projects in Singapore as a means to 
serve public interest (purchasers‖ interests) and try to maximize the 
rehabilitation process to serve the interests of the creditors.  Nevertheless, 
court faces difficulties in ascertaining the equilibrium balancing interests of 
the public and that of the creditors‖.  In other words, whether the public 
interests (for instance the aggrieved purchasers in abandoned housing 
projects) should prevail over the interests of the creditors in the course of 
judicial management administration and if the public interest prevails, how 
can the interests of the creditors can equally be protected in the same 
degree?  Thus, in carrying out judicial management, an emphasize on the 
public interests may not be the paramount concern of the judicial manager.  
Additionally, some of the reasons, not to concern public interest in carrying 
out judicial management by the judicial manager, are: this (rehabilitation of 
abandoned housing project being a way to protect and serve the public 
interest) may not be appropriate bearing in mind of the penalties in costs 
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(section 227B(9) of the SCA) which the unsuccessful applicant has to bare 
and the difficulty of establishing a qualifying public interest, what more if the 
rehabilitation can prejudice the interests of the creditors.  
 
On the making of a judicial management order the board of directors 
becomefunctus officio.  Their functions and powers are vested in the judicial 
manager, except that he does not have to call meetings (section 227G(2) 
SCA). 
 
Civil proceedings may not be commenced against a company in judicial 
management.  Existing actions are stayed.  Execution and distress may not 
be commenced or continued against the company‖s property. In effect, the 
company has immunity from legal proceedings, unless the leave of the 
judicial manager or the court is obtained (section 227D(4)(c) SCA).  
Similarly, no winding up order can be made nor can it be resolved to wind 
up the company (section 227D(1(b) SCA). 
The company‖s immunity from any legal actions only lasts as long as the 
judicial management order remains in force.  Unless it is otherwise 
discharged, a judicial management order remains in force for 180 days from 
the date of the order (section 227B(8) SCA).  The order may be extended by 
the court on the application of the judicial manager (section 227B(8) SCA) 
on some reasonable grounds. 
 
Thus, it is opined, in the case of the abandoned housing project whose 
housing developer company is insolvent and subject to a judicial 
management order, it is possible to revive the project.  One of the conditions 
is this: the proposal by the judicial manager to revive the project is approved 
by the creditors.  If the proposal is declined, the court may order that the 
judicial management order be discharged (section 227N(4) SCA).  If the 
creditors or the members think that they had been treated unfairly or 
prejudicially, because of the proposal or the effects of the proposal to revive 
the abandoned housing project, they may petition to the court pursuant to 
section 227R SCA. The court has wide powers to make such orders as it 
thinks fit to give relief in respect of the matters complained of (section 
227R(2) SCA).  
 
It should also be noted that the judicial management may also be 
discharged if the judicial manager thinks that the purposes of the judicial 
management order cannot be achieved (section 227Q(1) SCA).  Hence, if in 
the opinion of the judicial manager that it is not possible to revive the 
abandoned housing project, due to many complications, leading to the 
conclusion that the judicial management indispensably also cannot serve 
the intended purpose (rehabilitation of the company in the interest of the 
creditors), the judicial management order may be discharged on the 
application of the judicial manager.  
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Housing Delivery Concept in Singapore 
 
It is submitted also that, the position of aggrieved purchasers in abandoned 
housing projects of the insolvent housing developer companies in the 
Republic of Singapore is similar to the position in Malaysia.  However in 
Singapore 80% of the public housing development projects are carried out 
by the Housing and Development Board (HDB) a public and statutory body 
applying the “full build then sell” concept of housing delivery.  Thus, in this 
respect there would be no abandoned housing projects detrimental to the 
purchasers‖ interests in Singapore.  Only 20% of the public housing 
development projects are carried out by private housing developers using 
“full sell then build” concept of housing delivery.  It is opined, abandoned 
housing projects can also happen in Singapore by these private housing 
developer in Singapore. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
To recapitulate, the followings are the salient points emanating from the 
discussion of this chapter: 
1) It is opined that if abandoned housing projects occurred in the 
Republic of Singapore, the insolvency approaches – judicial 
management law and practice may not also fully protect the interests 
of the purchasers for instance, for enabling rehabilitation of 
abandoned housing projects left by the insolvent ailing housing 
developer companies.  This is because the JM serves to protect the 
interests of the creditors i.e they are creditors-centric, not the 
customers‖ and purchasers‖;  
2) However, the problem of abandoned housing projects in Singapore 
to a degree is eliminated as the government developer – Housing 
and Development Board (“HDB”) of Singapore implement “full build 
then sell” concept of housing delivery.  The total housing project 
undertaken by HDB in Singapore represents 80% of the whole 
housing projects in Singapore.  The remaining 20% projects are 
undertaken by the private housing developers applying “full sell then 
build” concept of housing delivery.  Thus, as an opinion, 
abandonment of housing projects may also occur in Singapore and 
the problems as faced in Malaysia may likewise faced by the 
aggrieved purchasers in Singapore; 
3) It is opined that if abandoned housing projects occurred in the UK, 
the Administration insolvency approach may not also fully protect the 
interests of the purchasers for instance, for enabling rehabilitation of 
abandoned housing projects left by the insolvent ailing housing 
developer companies.  This is because Administration serves to 
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protect the interests of the creditors i.e they are creditors-centric, not 
the customers‖ and purchasers‖.  Nonetheless, the problem of 
abandoned housing projects in the UK is resolved by the concept of 
housing delivery that is applicable there.  They apply “full build then 
sell” and “buying new homes off plan” or “selling off plan” concepts of 
housing development.  Under the latter concept, the purchasers are 
required to pay 10% of the purchase price, the balance 90% shall be 
paid on the duly completion of the house.  The purchasers are also 
protected with the housing development insurance subscribed by the 
housing developer companies and/or the purchasers themselves to 
cover them against any problems if abandonment occurs.  Thus the 
aggrieved purchaser can apply to the Administrator or the court to 
compel the Administrator to carry out rehabilitation of abandoned 
housing projects supported by the housing development insurance 
fund and/or to pay damages/compensations on the ground of 
contract and equity as enshrined in the terms of the contract of sale 
executed between the insolvent housing developer company and the 
purchasers; and, 
4) It is opined, provided that the insolvent housing developer company 
has in possession of housing development insurance, the aggrieved 
purchasers in abandoned housing projects in the UK may be 
marginalized and their abandoned housing projects may be stalled 
forever without any rehabilitation and they may not get compensation 
and damages through Administration; and, 
5) It is submitted that similar proposals as applicable in Malaysia in the 
face of the problems of abandoned housing projects be made 
applicable in the Republic of Singapore and the UK.  The proposals 
are these, viz: 
a) To apply “full build then and sell” concept of housing delivery 
for all public housing development projects; 
b) If the concept of “full sell then build” is to resume, the 
government of Singapore should introduce housing 
development insurance imposed on the applicant housing 
developers before housing developer licences can be 
granted.  The purpose of this insurance is to cover any 
shortfall in the funds and any other costs for carrying out 
rehabilitation of abandoned housing projects; and, 
c) The government of Singapore and the UK should introduce 
regulations governing rehabilitation of abandoned housing 
projects in order to protect the interests and rights of the 
aggrieved purchasers in the course of rehabilitation.  This 
suggestion is to ensure that the rehabilitation administration 
is smoothly done and can duly protect the interests and rights 
of all stakeholders, particularly the aggrieved purchasers in 
Singapore and the UK. 
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